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Abstract 
This paper draws on the psychology of risk and ³management guru´ literature 
(Huczynski, 2006) to examine how cybersecurity risks are constructed and communicated by 
cybersecurity specialists. We conduct a rhetorical analysis of ten recent cybersecurity 
publications ranging from popular media to academic and technical articles. We find most 
cybersecurity specialists in the popular domain use management guru techniques and manipulate 
common cognitive limitations in order to over-dramatize and over-simplify cybersecurity risks to 
critical infrastructure (CI). We argue there is a role for government: to collect, validate and 
disseminate more data among owners and operators of CI; to adopt institutional arrangements 
with an eye to moderating exaggerated claims; to reframe the debate as one of trade-offs between 
threats and opportunities as opposed to one of survival; and, finally, to encourage education 
programs in order to stimulate a more informed debate over the longer term. 
 
Keywords 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
There is a tension at the centre of our relationship with technology. On the one hand, 
there is incredible optimism that information technology can simultaneously improve service 
delivery and cut costs (Layne & Lee, 2001; Sharif, 2008). On the other hand, there is burgeoning 
IT security literature that warns that our increasing dependence on technology is becoming a 
liability because the technology can be so easily attacked by those with malicious intent, and the 
critical infrastructure and services that depend on it can be so easily discontinued (Clarke & 
Knake, 2010). Our paper is particularly interested in the latter claim. Much of the research on 
computer security and critical infrastructure protection, however, focuses on the ways in which 
organizations secure their networks and information in the supply chain (Kolluru & Meredith, 
2001; Faisal, Banwet & Shankar, 2006; Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). Less attention has 
been paid to how organizations construct and understand cybersecurity risks. Our failure to do so 
constitutes a risk in itself. It is not enough for systems to be secure; they have to seem secure 
(Bertot, Jaeger & Grimes, 2010). 
 There are three purposes to this paper. The first is to provide an understanding of how 
cybersecurity risk is constructed. We will draw on the psychology of risk literature to show that 
people have numerous biases that prevent them from drawing reliable inferences in the face of 
uncertainty. Following this, we examine µPDQDJHPHQWJXUXV¶OLWHUDWXUHZKLFKexplains how 
consultants, academics and authors who profit from selling solutions to complex organizational 
issues persuade audiences of the usefulness of their ideas. Secondly, we use the techniques 
Nørreklit (2003) employed in her rhetorical analysis of The Balanced Scorecard to analyze 
cybersecurity discourse in ten recent publications. The publications range from popular print 
media to TED Talks to academic and technical articles. We are particularly interested in 
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examining the extent to which cybersecurity specialists are using management guru techniques 
and manipulating common cognitive limitations in order to over-dramatize and over-simplify 
cybersecurity risks.  
Finally, using a cybernetic understanding of control (information gathering, standard 
setting and behaviour modification), we examine the policy challenges that emerge as a result of 
the present framing of cybersecurity risks. The ultimate goal will be to question the effectiveness 
of how we talk about and raise awareness of cybersecurity issues in general and what policies we 
should adopt to address potential weaknesses in governance of cyberspace that are aggravated 
further by the present cybersecurity discourse. 
   
 
2.0 The Psychology of Risk and the Techniques of Management Gurus 
2.1 The psychology of risk 
Burns (2012) argues it is important to understand risk perception for two reasons. First, 
ULVNSHUFHSWLRQKHOSVXVWRXQGHUVWDQGDQGSUHGLFWSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRur. Secondly, awareness of 
how perceptions are constructed helps to improve communication between technical experts and 
laypersons. The psychometric paradigm draws on the work of cognitive psychologists such as 
Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1982) to conceptualize risks as personal expressions of 
individual fears or expectations. In short, individuals respond to their perceptions whether or not 
these perceptions reflect reality. The study of risk perception has grown significantly over recent 
decades and has constituted a significant challenge to rational actor approaches to risk (see for 
example Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1971; Slovic, 1987; Jaeger, Renn, Rosa & Webler, 2001; Pennings 
& Grossman, 2008; Lachlan & Spence, 2010; Pachur, Hertwig & Steinmann, 2012). The 
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SV\FKRORJ\RIULVNOLWHUDWXUHKDVLGHQWLILHGVHYHUDOELDVHVLQSHRSOH¶VDELOLW\WRGUDZinferences in 
the face of uncertainty. Risk perception can be influenced by properties such as personal control 
(Langer, 1975), familiarity (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), exit options (Starr, 1969), equitable 
sharing of both benefits and risks (Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn & Satterfield, 2000) and the 
potential to blame an institution or person (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). It can also be 
associated with how a person feels about something, such as a particular technology or a disease 
(Alhakami & Slovic, 1994). People also show confirmation bias (Wason, 1960), which suggests 
they seek information to confirm how they feel, not to challenge it.  
A central finding of the risk perception literature is that perceptions are often, in fact, 
faulty, when we consider consequence and probability (Slovic et al., 1982). Risk cannot be 
directly observed; rather, it is constructed by people based upon their understanding of hazards in 
everyday life. People often make judgments about risk using incomplete or erroneous 
information. They also rely on judgmental biases or heuristics to comprehend complexity. 
Heuristics are cognitive tools people use to analyze risk and complexity (Slovic et al., 1982). In 
some ways, they are helpful; heuristics allow people to render simplistic understandings of 
complicated subjects. However, they can also oversimplify or distort our understanding. 
Heuristics fall along two primary dimensions: the unknown factor and the dread factor. The 
unknown factor influences people to be more concerned with risks that are not observable or 
known to science (Slovic et al., 1982). On the other dimension, the dread factor influences 
people to be more concerned with risks that are not controllable and pose potentially catastrophic 
consequences (Slovic et al., 1982).  
One of the most common heuristics is availability. Under the influence of the availability 
heuristic, people tend to believe that an event is more likely to occur if they are able to imagine 
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or recall it easily (see for example Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1979; Folkes, 1988; Betsch 
& Pohl, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Maldonato & 'HOO¶2UFR)RULQVWDQFHIHDURI
shark attacks increased dramatically after the release of the movie Jaws, despite the fact that 
there was no empirical evidence to suggest that shark attacks had suddenly become more 
probable (Slovic et al., 1979). By contrast, availability can also lull people into a false sense of 
security regarding the risks associated with everyday tasks, such as in the workplace or the 
home. Availability is considered to be one of the most important heuristics for understanding risk 
perception (Sjöberg, 2000). For instance, the availability heuristic influences people to be 
concerned about terrorist attacks despite the fact that ± like other many high-profile risks ± it is 
considered to be extremely unlikely (Gierlach, Belsher & Beutler, 2010). This phenomenon is 
UHIHUUHGWRDVµSUREDELOLW\QHJOHFW¶ (Slovic, Peters, Finucane & Macgregor, 2005). When 
probability neglect is at work, ³SHRSOH¶VDWWHQWLRQLVIRFXVHGRQWKHEDGRXWFRPHLWVHOIDQGWKH\
DUHLQDWWHQWLYHWRWKHIDFWWKDWLWLVXQOLNHO\WRRFFXU´ (Sunstein, 2003, p. 122). In other words, 
people tend to overemphasize the consequences of risks while minimizing or even ignoring the 
probabilities. 
 
2.2 Management gurus 
7KHWHUPµPDQDJHPHQWJXUX¶UHIHUVWRWKHDXWKRUVSXEOLVKHUVHGLWRUVFRQVXOWDQWV
managers, commercial seminar organizers and professors who offer advice on business and 
management (Kieser, 1997). The field is primarily LQWHUHVWHGLQ³KRZPDQDJHPHQWNQRZOHGJHLV
created, processed into saleable products and services, how it is marketed, communicated to 
FXVWRPHUVDQGKRZLWLVFRQVXPHGE\WKHP´+XF]\QVNL, 2006, p. 2). The field has also attracted 
business and management academics critical of the ambitious prescriptions offered by 
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management gurus. The management guru literature can therefore be understood as both a 
reaction against and response to the popular literature on business and management.  
There are three key themes in the management guru literature: how guru ideas become 
popularized, their unique appeal to managers and common techniques. 
Management gurus are considered to be influential because they inspire managers to 
implement their solutions to solve complex organizational problems (Huczynski, 2006). A key 
finding of the literature is that these cures come and go over time. Kieser (1997) likens the rise 
and fall of management trends to the fashion industry. He notes that ³DWWKHVWDUWRIWKHIDVKLRQ
only a few pioneers are daring enough to take it up. These few are joined by a rising number of 
LPLWDWRUVXQWLOWKHIDVKLRQLVµRXW¶DQGQHZIDVKLRQVFRPHRQWKHPDUNHW´.LHVHUS
In addition to explaining the rise and fall of management trends, this metaphor is helpful for 
capturing the influential role that aesthetics play in management trends as well. Røvik (2011) 
argues that the rise and fall of management trends can also be compared to the lifecycle of a 
virus. The virus theory helps to explain what happens to organizations once they have been 
µLQIHFWHG¶ZLWKDQHZRUJDQL]DWLRQDOLGHD2UJDQL]DWLRQVW\SLFDOO\JRWKURXJKWKHVWDJHVRI
³LQIHFWLRXVQHVVLPPXQLW\UHSOLFDWLRQLQFXEDWLRQPXWDWLRQDQGGRUPDQF\´EHIRUHWKHQH[WIDG
takes hold (Røvik, 2011, p. 635). Finally, organizations do not build immunity to management 
fads over time. Despite the fact that guru ideas have only a modest impact on actual working life, 
managers always seem prepared to entertain the next trend. 
One of the central questions of the literature is why managers are particularly susceptible 
to guru ideas, especially given their limited practical results. Ahonen and Kallio (2009) argue 
that guru ideas are a form of cultural expression. From this perspective, the management model 
LVWKH+RO\*UDLO³WRZKLFKDOOVHHPLQJO\JRRGYDOXHVDQGLGHDVKDYHEHHQSURMHFWHG´$KRQHQ& 
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Kallio, 2009). Much like the quest for the Holy Grail, the search for the ideal management model 
is more important than the model itself. It also represents many ideals in liberal Western 
democracy, such as the never-HQGLQJTXHVWIRU³HIILFLHQF\VXFFHVVDQGZHOIDUH´$KRQHQ& 
Kallio, 2009, p. 433). As such, the search for the best management ideas serves a therapeutic role 
for managers and gurus alike. Other researchers explain the appeal of gurus through their 
impressive performances. Clark and Salaman (1996) liken these performances to that of a 
ZLWFKGRFWRUVLQFHJXUXVJLYH³DµGUDPDWLFUHDOL]DWLRQ¶LQZKLFKWKHSHUIRUPHUFRQYH\VWRDQ
DXGLHQFHWKDWZKLFKWKH\ZLVKWRH[SUHVV´S 
The literature also accounts for how popular management ideas become influential. One 
of the fundamental findings is that rhetoric is a common and influential technique. For example, 
Hood and Jackson (1991) argue that persuasion fuels organizational change more often than 
objective facts. In their view, speakers attempt to establish their theories as the most credible, not 
necessarily the most truthful. To this end, Hood and Jackson (1991) identify six salient features 
of administrative arguments: their universal appeal, contradictory nature, instability, use of 
recycled ideas, reliance on soft data and logic, and competition with rival ideas through 
aesthetics rDWKHUWKDQHYLGHQFH%HUJOXQGDQG:HUUVXSSRUW+RRGDQG-DFNVRQ¶V
typology, adding that management gurus rely on the use of contradictory business myths or ideas 
to adapt their arguments to suit any need or audience. Furthermore, Keulen and Kroeze (2012) 
bring attention to the way management gurus frame their arguments using historical narratives or 
anecdotes to express the soundness of their ideas. The use of anecdotes is also a persuasive 
method to position management gurus as the purveyors of practical knowledge in contrast to the 
theoretical knowledge offered by academics. This positioning lends management gurus affinity 
ZLWKPDQDJHUVDVµRQHRIXV¶+XF]\QVNLGovernment is not immune to this trend either. 
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The public sector was most IDPRXVO\FDSWXUHGE\WKHµUHLQYHQWLQJJRYHUQPHQW¶PRYHPHQW, 
which rested on the assumption that governments and the public sector should learn from the 
private sector (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; see also Moore, 1995; Osborne & Plastrik, 1997).  
Management guru techniques and heuristics are powerful tools. The psychology-of-risk 
literature and management guru literature are connected to this study by the way gurus are able 
to overdramatize or oversimplify complex organizational issues. Their objective is to inspire 
managers ± usually using rhetorical arguments ± to implement their solutions to solve complex 
organizational problems. Often these problems are based on issues related to the efficiency, 
success or welfare of an organization. As the next section will demonstrate, these themes are also 
prevalent in the cybersecurity discourse.  
 
3.0 Rhetorical analysis: Cybersecurity discourse examined 
 
3.1 Depictions of cybersecurity threats  
From a risk governance perspective, cybersecurity threats might usefully be described as 
³XQFHUWDLQULVNV´5HQQ8QFHUWDLQULVNVRFFXUZKHUHWKHUHLV³DODFNRIFOHDUVFLHQWLILFRU
WHFKQLFDOEDVLVIRUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ´In other words, we often lack reliable empirical data to 
estimate with confidence the probability and consequence of the risk. This limitation diminishes 
the confidence level of traditional objective measures of risk estimation and becomes more 
UHOLDQWRQ³IX]]\´RUVXEMHFWLYHPHDVXUHVRIULVNHVWLPDWLRQ5HQQ-19).  As a result, 
these risk events can generate µsurprises¶ or realizations that are not anticipated or explained 
explicitly within a risk modeling framework. 
Despite the increase in popular discourse about cybersecurity, there is reason to be 
careful about over-estimating the probability of the risks and to ensure we understand the 
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motivations behind different actions.  Today, there are four main depictions of threats in the 
cybersecurity literature:  
x Cyber-terrorism ± 7HUURULVPLVFRPPRQO\GHILQHGDV³the purposeful act or the threat of 
the act of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of 
WKHDFWRUWKUHDW´6WRKO7, p. 229). Cyber-terrorism means that these acts are 
committed using technology.  
x µ+DFNWLYLVP¶ ± RHIHUVWR³WKHPDUULDJHRI KDFNLQJZLWKSROLWLFDODFWLYLVP´6WRKO7, 
p. 236).  
x Cyber-crime ± Refers to criminal offenses committed on-line or through other forms of 
information technology.  
x Cyber-warfare ± ReIHUVWR³WKHUROHRILQIRUPDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\DVDQHQDEOHURIZDUIDUH´ 
(Colarik & Janczewski, 2012, p. 39). 
While these are four prevalent types of cybersecurity issues, there is evidence to suggest that the 
threat is exaggerated and oversimplified for some. Many note the lack of empirical evidence to 
support the widespread fear of cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare, for instance (Lewis, 2003; 
Stohl, 2007; Cavelty, 2007; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009; Rid, 2013). 
According to Stohl (2007), there is little vulnerability in critical infrastructure that could 
lead to violence or fatalities. Secondly, there are few actors who would be interested in or 
capable of exploiting such vulnerabilities. Thirdly, and in relation to cyber-terrorism in 
particular, the expenses necessary to carry out cyber-attacks are greater than traditional forms of 
terrorism, limiting the utility of cyber-attacks compared to other available measures (Stohl, 
2007). Instead, technology is most often used by terrorists to provide information, solicit 
financial support, network with like-minded terrorists, recruit, and gather information; in other 
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ZRUGV³terrorist groups are simply exploiting modern tools to accomplish the same goals they 
VRXJKWLQWKHSDVW´6WRKO7, p. 230).  
By contrast, µhacktivism¶ is much more common. Typically, hackers use ³virtual sit-ins 
and blockades; automated e-mail bombs; web hacks and computer break-ins; and computer 
viruses and worms´ to draw attention to their cause (Stohl, 2007S:KLOHµKDFNWLYLVP¶
does encompass the political aspect necessary to categorize these kinds of attacks as cyber-
terrorism, the objective of hackers is more often to cause mischief for the targeted organization 
rather than to cause violence or death. Cyber-crime is also a major issue, but more problematic in 
terms of law enforcement and business (Lewis, 2003). The most common forms of cyber-crime 
include ³insider threats, extortion, industrial espionage, and loss of financial data or intellectual 
property to outsiders´/HZLV'HVSLWHWKHLUUHODWLYHIUHTXHQF\WKUHDWVIURPµKDFNWLYLVP¶
or cyber-crime are either overshadowed by or misrepresented as cyber-terror. This representation 
has the effect of increasing awareness of high impact/low probability threats such as cyber-
WHUURULVPZKLOHPRUHFRPPRQIRUPVRIF\EHUVHFXULW\ULVNOLNHµKDFNWLYLVP¶RUF\EHU-crime and 
the sources of these more common problems receive less attention.  
 
3.2 Rhetorical analysis of the cyber discourse 
3.2.1 Rhetorical analysis methodology 
Based on Nørreklit¶VUKHWRULFDODQDO\VLVRIWKHDUJXPHQWDWLRQLQ.DSODQDQG
1RUWRQ¶VThe Balanced Scorecard, we structure our analysis according to the categories below. 
x Appeal to the audience ± appeal tRWKHDXGLHQFH¶Vethos or trust in the credibility of 
WKHVRXUFHWRWKHDXGLHQFH¶Vpathos RUHPRWLRQVRUWRWKHDXGLHQFH¶Vlogos or logic 
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(Aristotle & Kennedy, 1991). The genre of text will typically influence the type of 
appeal used.  
x Stylistic devices ± use of popular tropes used in the guru field including analogies, 
metaphors, similes, metonymy, hyperbole, irony, antithesis, loaded adjectives and 
imprecise and intertextually-based concepts. 
x Argumentation model ± involves three basic elements: a claim, data and a warrant 
(Walton, 1996). The claim refers to the point of view the source wishes the 
audience to accept. Data refers to the evidence the source uses to support the claim. 
Finally, the warrant is often implicit and combines the claim and data (Nørreklit, 
2003). 
 
Table 1: Cases 
Author(s) Date published Title Type  Country 
Richard A. Clarke & 
Robert Knake 
December 2010 Cyber War: The 
Next Threat to 
National Security 
and What to Do 
About It 
(Introduction & 
Chapter 1) 
Book (Non-fiction) United States 
Richard Clarke February 16, 
2012 
Cyber-attacks can 
spark real wars 
Newspaper article 
(Wall Street 
Journal) 
United States 
Misha Glenny May 18, 2012 &DQDGD¶VZHDNOLQJ
web defenses 
Newspaper article 
(Globe and Mail) 
 
Canada 
Joe Lieberman October 17, 
2012 
The threat is real 
and must be 
stopped 
Newspaper article 
(New York Times) 
United States 
Con Coughlin October 14, 
2010 
Cyber guards or 
soldiers: Which do 
we need most? 
Newspaper article 
(Daily Telegraph) 
United 
Kingdom 
Misha Glenny July 2011 Hire the hackers! Ted Talk 
(Journalist) 
United States 
Avi Rubin October 2011 All your devices 
can be hacked 
Ted Talk 
(Academic) 
United States 
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Nicholson, 
Webber, Dyer, 
Patel & Janicke  
2012 
 
SCADA security 
in the light of 
cyber-warfare 
Scholarly article United 
Kingdom 
 
Laura Mather April 21, 2011 Cyber-security 
requires a multi-
layered approach 
Technical magazine 
(Info Security 
Magazine) 
United States 
Tony Busseri 
 
March 12, 2012 ,W¶VWLPHWRWDNH
cyber-security 
seriously 
Technical magazine 
(Wired Magazine) 
United States 
 
 
The samples were chosen based on their publication date (between 2010 and 2012), the 
medium in which they were published and their relevance to the study at hand. Efforts were 
made to collect samples from a variety of sources, including the popular print media, from 
technical experts and from academia. The authors of these pieces come from diverse fields, 
representing politicians, public servants, journalists, CEOs, academics and computer scientists.  
 The limits of this analysis include the sample size, the sampling method, and the 
collection of the data. The number of cases used here (n=10) impacts the generalizability of this 
VWXG\7KHVDPSOLQJPHWKRGDQRQSUREDELOLW\PHWKRGFDOOHGµTXRWDVDPSOLQJ¶DOVRLQIOXHQFHV
WKHUHVXOWV8VLQJµTXRWDVDPSOLQJ¶WKHSRSXODWLRQRIF\EHUVHFXULW\GLVFRXUVHZDVVHSDUDWHG into 
distinct and mutually exclusive categories or sub-groups. Judgment was then exercised by the 
researchers to select samples from each sub-category according to predetermined proportions. In 
other words, selection of the data was non-random.  
The benefits of this method are that all relevant categories were covered and there was 
greater variability in the samples than random sampling can sometimes achieve. The downside of 
this method is that a subjective judgment was made by the researchers about which samples to 
include in the study. The potential issue with this approach is that the researchers may have 
inadvertently chosen cases that appear to support their hypothesis while excluding those that do 
QRW:KLOHWKLVSUREOHPLVLQGHHGDYDOLGFRQFHUQµTXRWDVDPSOLQJ¶LVWKHPRVWDSSropriate 
method for this paper. The paper is primarily interested in whether rhetoric is being used by 
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cybersecurity specialists and in which ways. While this is an initial study into the use of 
management guru techniques in cybersecurity, a larger study would be a fruitful topic for future 
research. 
 
3.2.2 Results 
Appeal to the audience 
 The most common type of appeal used in the sample is to pathos; seven of the ten 
samples use it. The three academic/technical pieces did not (Nicholson, Webber, Dyer, Patel & 
Janicke, 2012; Mather, 2011; Busseri, 2012). There are several emotional appeals at play. The 
first is based on fears about SHRSOH¶VODFNRIFRQWURO and WHFKQRORJ\¶Vpotential to cause 
catastrophe, both themes that generate negative risk perceptions according to risk psychology 
literature. For instance, some of the samples note the potential for digital devices to be infected 
ZLWKYLUXVHVZLWKRXWXVHUV¶NQRZOHGJHDQGWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWVHQVLWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQFDQEH 
stolen or lost on-line (Clarke & Knake, 2010; Glenny, May 2011). The articles conflate the 
characteristics of living and non-living entities in order to convey, on the one hand, a sinister and 
motivated entity and, on the other hand, an entity that has immediate global reach and is 
indifferent to inflicting human suffering or financial loss. This is captured most effectively in the 
GHVFULSWLRQRI³]RPELHV´ (See Table 2.) 
Table 2: Computers DVµ=RPELHV¶:  Living and non-living characteristics, focussed on 
destruction   
 
Author (s) Examples 
Clarke and Knake 
(2010) 
³6RPHWLPHVWKH]RPELHFRPSXWHUVLWVSDWLHQWO\ZDLWLQJRUGHUV2WKHUWLPHV
it begins to look for other computers to attack. When one computer spreads 
its infection to others, and they in turn do the same, we have the 
SKHQRPHQRQNQRZQDVDµZRUP¶WKHLQIHFWLRQZRUPLQJLWVZD\IURPRQH
computer through thousands to millions. An infection can spread across the 
JOREHLQPHUHKRXUV´S 
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Glenny (May 
2011) 
³A bedrRFNRIF\EHUFULPLQDOLW\LVWKHµGLVWULEXWHGGHQLDORIVHUYLFH¶ attack, 
in which tens of thousands of zombie computers enslaved by viruses to a 
command-and-control machine will lay siege to a company¶s or 
organization's system.´ 
 
Four of the samples associate cybersecurity with warfare (see Table 3), which the risk-
psychology literature indicates generates high dread. Technology is characterized as a tool of 
modern warfare with effects as devastating as conventional or even nuclear warfare (Clarke, 
2012; Coughlin, 2010). There are several references to technology as a weapon, World War II, 
the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction, and the ³War on Terror´ (Clarke & Knake, 2010; 
Clarke, 2012; Coughlin, 2010; Nicholson et al., 2012). China and Russia in particular are shown 
to use technology in clandestine ways, such as for spying on Western governments and private 
businesses for the purposes of crime and industrial espionage. Three samples note instances in 
which technology was used as a form of conventional warfare as well (Clarke & Knake, 2010; 
Coughlin, 2010; Nicholson et al., 2012). 
Table 3: Cyberspace as µbattlefield¶ is a common metaphor 
 
Author (s) Examples 
Clarke and Knake 
(2010) 
³,QDQWLFLSDWLRQRIKRVWLOLWLHVQDWLRQVDUHDOUHDG\µSUHSDULQJWKHEDWWOHILHOG¶
7KH\DUHKDFNLQJLQWRHDFKRWKHU¶VQHWZRUNVDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHVOD\LQJLQ
trapdoors and logic bombs ± now, in peacetime. This ongoing nature of 
cyber war, the blurring of peace and war, adds a dangerous new dimension 
RILQVWDELOLW\´S 
Coughlin (2010) ³But there is also a growing body of opinion, within both military and 
intelligence circles, that future threats are as likely to take place in cyber 
space as on the battlefield.´ 
Nicholson et al. 
(2012) 
³,WLVunderstood that attacks and defence issued by nation states take place 
over networks rather than by physical means such as army personnel, 
vehLFOHVDQGEDUUDFNV´S 
 
Further evidence of the use of technology for conventional warfare includes the Stuxnet 
computer worm used by the United States and Israel to disrupt the Iranian nuclear program in 
2010 and the use of technology by Russia in its 2008 conflict with Georgia (Clarke & Knake, 
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2010; Nicholson et al., 2012). Coughlin (2010) begins his article with a hypothetical 
³FOLFNVNULHJ´EHWZHHQ*UHDW%ULWDLQDQG&KLQD, an example we analyze further in the stylistic 
devices section.  These examples emphasize the use of technology to disable communications 
and power systems on a large scale. The samples do not, however, show technology inflicting the 
direct physical harm that could compare with conventional weaponry or nuclear attacks. 
Furthermore, there is a sense that the West ± especially the United States ± is falling behind the 
technological capabilities of countries like China and Russia (see Table 4), which recalls the 
arms race of the Cold War (Coughlin, 2010; Glenny, May 2011; Glenny, July 2011; Nicholson et 
al., 2012).  
 
Table 4: Cold War Parallels: Russia and China are most advanced and should be feared 
 
Author (s) Examples 
Coughlin (2010) ³2QWKHRQHKDQGWKHUHLVWKHGDQJHUSRVHGE\FRXQWULHVVXFKDV&KLQD
which has invested enormous resources in trying to use the internet to 
infiltrate Western governments and institutions, in order to acquire 
information on military capabilities and sensitive commercial information 
that can be used to Beijing¶VDGYDQWDJH´ 
Glenny (May 
2011) 
³After all, you never know whether your hacker is working for Russian 
organized crime, an Indian manufacturer, or the People's Liberation Army. 
Relative to other Western countries, Canada¶s cyberdefences lack funding 
DQGDFRKHUHQWVWUDWHJ\´ 
Glenny (July 
2011) 
³In China, in Russia and in loads of other countries that are developing 
cyber-offensive capabilities, this is exactly what they are doing. They are 
recruiting hackers both before and after they become involved in criminal 
and industrial espionage activities -- are mobilizing them on behalf of the 
state. We need to engage and find ways of offering guidance to these young 
people, because they are a remarkable breed.´ 
Nicholson et al., 
2012 
³$Vwas demonstrated by the Chinese and Russian spies in Gorman (2009) 
it is clear that other nations are perpetrators and their reasons include 
industrial espionage and military purposes. As evidence is beginning to 
show, these actions demonstrate that elements of future wars are likely to 
be fought in cyberspace´S 
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Finally, there are also associations made between technology and terrorism, often in the 
form of attacks on critical infrastructure (see Table 5) (Clarke & Knake, 2010; Clarke, 2012; 
Glenny, July 2011; Lieberman, 2012; Nicholson et al., 2012; Coughlin, 2010; Busseri, 2012). 
Yet the cases only cite the potential for cyber-terrorism; in fact, there have yet to be any recorded 
incidents on this scale (Clarke, 2012). As one author notes, terrorists may wish to use technology 
for such purposes but they currently lack the skills (Nicholson et al., 2012).  
 
Table 5: Critical infrastructure depicted as vulnerable 
 
Author (s) Examples 
Clarke and Knake 
(2010) 
³,IWKH\WDNHRYHUDQHWZRUNF\EHUwarriors could steal all of its 
information or send out instructions that move money, spill oil, vent gas, 
blow up generators, derail trains, crash airplanes, send a platoon into an 
DPEXVKRUFDXVHDPLVVLOHWRGHWRQDWHLQWKHZURQJSODFH´ 
Clarke (2012) ³If the hackers turn their attention to disruption and destruction, as some 
have threatened, they are likely to find the controls for electric power grids, 
oil pipelines and precious water systems inadequately secured. If a hacker 
causes real physical damage to critical systems in that region, it could 
quickly involve governments retaliating against each other with both cyber 
DQGFRQYHQWLRQDOZHDSRQV´ 
Lieberman (2012) ³The threat of a cyber attack on our electric grid, water supply system, 
financial networks, or oil and gas lines is anything but hype. I have been 
concerned about this threat for years, and the evidence has grown 
exponentially that sophisticated adversaries could paralyze the nation with 
targeted cyber attacks on critical networks.´ 
Nicholson et al. 
(2012) 
³:KLOVWQRQHRIWKHVHLQFLGHQWVKDYHEHHQRI¿FLDOO\UHSRUWHGDVDWWDFNVRQ
SCADA systems they demonstrate the dependence of critical infrastructure 
on these systems and illustrate the widespread impact that could occur 
should an attack on a critical infrastructure take place. The possible damage 
that such a cyber attack could cause is comparable to that of a physical 
attack such as 9/11´S 
Coughlin (2010) ³At the press of a mouse button, power stations, water firms, air traffic 
control and all government and financial systems are shut down. In the 
VSDFHRIDIHZPLQXWHVWKHHQWLUHQDWLRQKDVEHHQSDUDO\VHG´ 
 
Few examples of cyber-WHUURULVPDOLJQZLWKWKHOLWHUDWXUH¶VGHILQLWLRQRIWHUURULVPOnly 
one case argues that technology has been used for ideological purposes, a necessary feature of a 
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terrorist attack. Glenny (July 2011) argues that the hacker group Anonymous uses technology as 
a form of anarchism. Anonymous has limited its actions to mischief thus far, a characteristic 
PRUHLQFRPPRQZLWKµKDFNWLYLVP¶WKDQF\EHU-terrorism. There is also only one case that gives 
evidence of technology being used to inflict direct physical harm but in these cases they were 
FRPSXWHUVFLHQWLVWV¶H[SHULPHQWs. Most of the discussion of cyber-terrorism therefore follows the 
FULWLFDOOLWHUDWXUH¶VSUHGLFWLRQWKDWLWLVRIWHQFRQIXVHGZLWKF\EHU-FULPHRUµKDFNWLYLVP¶  
TKHVDPSOHVDOVRGLVSOD\DSSHDOVWRWKHDXGLHQFH¶VHWKRVWUXVWLQWKHFUHGLELOLW\RIWKH
source) and logos (logic). Given the complexity of cybersecurity issues, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that many of the authors have technical expertise in the field of computer science 
(Rubin, 2011; Nicholson et al., 2012; Mather, 2011; Busseri, 2012). The samples also feature 
current or former United States politicians and public servants with experience in national 
security (Clarke & Knake, 2010; Clarke, 2012; Lieberman, 2012) and bipartisanship, such as Joe 
Lieberman and Richard Clarke. These qualities help to establish credibility. 
Logos is most apparent in the academic article by Nicholson et al. (2012), the TED Talk 
by Rubin (2011), and the technical op-eds by Mather (2011) and Busseri (2012). While these 
pieces also argue that cybersecurity is a threat, they primarily make their appeal by offering 
empirical evidence about the likelihood and impact of such attacks. They also define the ways in 
which technology can be used to initiate cyber-attacks, accurately differentiating between 
µKDFNWLYLVP¶F\EHU-crime and cyber-terrorism. Finally, they offer technical solutions to combat 
future cyber-attacks.  
By contrast, Clarke and Knake (2010), Clarke (2012), Coughlin (2010), and Glenny (May 
2011, July 2011) emphasize the consequences of cyber-attacks and attenuate their probability. 
They also rely on anecdotal evidence to advance their arguments and frequently conflate cyber-
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warfare and cyber-WHUURULVPZLWKµKDFNWLYLVP¶DQGF\EHU-crime. Finally, they offer vague 
solutions to thwart cybersecurity threats. Indeed, the authors of these pieces raise awareness 
about the potential problems with cybersecurity rather than offer solutions.  
 
Stylistic devices 
The cybersecurity literature analyzed here uses metaphors, antithesis and irony, in 
particular. These three common stylistic devices will be described in detail. 
 The most predominant metaphor at use in the samples is the idea of cyberspace as a 
battlefield (see Table 3). From this perspective, information technology is a new weapon that can 
be wielded with devastating consequences. There is a clear difference between the depiction of 
cyber-warfare in the technical and popular pieces, however. In the technical pieces by Mather 
(2011) and Busseri (2012), the notion of cyber-warfare is used to explain common attacks on 
networked computers. The types of attacks the experts are most concerned about are those 
emanating from hackers and cyber-criminals. The focus of these pieces is therefore to alert the 
technical community about emerging threats, draw attention to existing vulnerabilities, and to 
share good practices on how to detect and prevent cyber-attacks.  
By contrast, the popular pieces are more concerned with technology being used for 
traditional terrorism purposes, such as attacking critical infrastructure (see Table 4). These 
samples also warn about the potential of technology to become incorporated into conventional 
ZDUIDUH7KLVIHDULVSOD\HGRXWWRGUDPDWLFHIIHFWLQWKHRSHQLQJRI&RXJKOLQ¶V (2010) article: 
The year is 2025 . . . Chinese cyber warriors launch a ³clickskrieg´ against 
mainland Britain. At the press of a mouse button, power stations, water firms, air 
traffic control and all government and financial systems are shut down. In the 
space of a few minutes, the entire nation has been paralysed (Coughlin, 2010). 
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In this metaphor, technology has the potential for serious and sinister purposes. This idea 
is reinforced through other pieces, likening the destructive potential of technology to other well-
known incidents, such as World War II, Pearl Harbor, the Cold War or September 11th. 
Recalling the power of the availability heuristic, this metaphor creates an association between 
technology and well known traumatic events, making it seem as if technology could cause the 
same consequences. While the samples call for action to prevent such catastrophes, they offer 
little to no empirical evidence that technology can be used for such purposes. 
 The use of antithesis is also prevalent in four samples, three of which use the battlefield 
metaphor (Clarke & Knake, 2010; Clarke, 2012; Coughlin, 2010; Rubin, 2011). The contrast 
between conventional warfare and cyber-warfare used in Coughlin (2010), for example, gives 
the impression that cyber-warfare is replacing conventional warfare. This depiction conveys the 
notion that we at a critical moment in time ± that cyber-warfare is somehow different and more 
advanced than conventional warfare, and that relying exclusively on conventional warfare is 
misguided and in fact creates important vulnerabilities.  
 Finally, the use of irony is prevalent in six of the samples. This stylistic device is used to 
argue that people have benefited from advances in information technology but are now more 
vulnerable because of it as well. Individuals, governments and organizations can never truly keep 
their cybersecurity defenses up-to-date because of the rapid pace of technological innovation and 
change and that it is fully embedded in our society (Clark & Knake, 2010; Glenny, May 2011, 
July 2011; Lieberman, 2012; Mather, 2011; Busseri, 2012). Therefore, irony is used to justify the 
ongoing need for cybersecurity solutions, invoking a perpetual mission to improve cybersecurity 
that can never end.  
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Argumentation model 
The samples display three common logical fallacies. The first is inductive argument. 
Clarke and Knake (2010) argue that because a certain country experiences devastating and 
disruptive attacks, then all cyber-attacks will be devastating and disruptive. The argument 
ignores probabilities. Four samples use the second logical fallacy, argumentum ad populum, 
which is an appeal to the authority of the many (Cathcart & Klein, 2007; Clarke & Knake, 2010; 
Glenny, May 2011, July 2011; Coughlin, 2010). Glenny (May 2011), for example, argues that 
Canada needs to have a government-run computer HPHUJHQF\UHVSRQVHWHDPEHFDXVH³LWLVWKH
RQO\PDMRU:HVWHUQFRXQWU\QRWWRKDYHRQH´,QRWKHUZRUGVLIHYHU\RWKHUFRXQWU\LVGRLQJLW
Canada should as well. Glenny (July 2011) also argues that Western countries should hire 
hackers to run their computer security systems because countries like Russia and China have 
already recruited them. The third logical fallacy, which is present in two samples, is implicit 
warrant. Clarke (2010), for example, argues that if something is old, it must be of no use. Glenny 
(May, 2011) employs an implicit warrant when he argues that, first, EHFDXVH&DQDGD¶VFRPSXWHU
energy response centre guards the country¶s critical national infrastructure, it needs to be ³in 
JRYHUQPHQWKDQGV´ and, secondly, EHFDXVHLWLQYROYHVQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\&DQDGD¶VPLOLWDU\
should manage cybersecurity. Table 6 summarizes our findings. 
 
Table 6: Summary of key findings µ¥¶LVDFKHFNPDUNLWLQGLFDWHVµSUHVHQW¶RUµDIILUPDWLYH¶ 
 
Case Appeal to Audience Stylistic Devices Argumentation Model 
Cyber War 
Richard A. Clarke & 
Robert Knake (2010) 
Ethos я Metaphor я Inductive argument я 
 
Logos  Antithesis я Argumentum ad populum я 
Pathos я Irony я Implicit warrant 
Cyber-attacks can 
spark real wars 
Richard Clarke (2012) 
Ethos я Metaphor я Inductive argument 
Logos Antithesis я Argumentum ad populum 
Pathos я Irony Implicit warrant я 
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&DQDGD¶VZHDNOLQJ
web defenses 
Misha Glenny (May 
18, 2011) 
Ethos Metaphor я Inductive argument 
Logos Antithesis Argumentum ad populum я 
Pathos я Irony я Implicit warrant я 
The threat is real and 
must be stopped 
Joe Lieberman (2012) 
Ethos я Metaphor я Inductive argument 
Logos Antithesis Argumentum ad populum 
Pathos я Irony я Implicit warrant 
Cyber guards or 
soldiers: Which do we 
need most? 
Con Coughlin (2010) 
Ethos Metaphor я Inductive argument 
Logos Antithesis я Argumentum ad populum я 
Pathos я Irony Implicit warrant 
Hire the hackers! 
Misha Glenny (July 
2011) 
Ethos Metaphor я Inductive argument 
Logos Antithesis Argumentum ad populum я 
Pathos я Irony я Implicit warrant 
All your devices can be 
hacked  
Avi Rubin (2011) 
Ethos Metaphor я Inductive argument 
Logos я Antithesis я Argumentum ad populum 
Pathos я Irony Implicit warrant 
SCADA security in the 
light of cyber-warfare 
 Nicholson et al. 
(2012) 
Ethos Metaphor я Inductive argument 
Logos я Antithesis Argumentum ad populum 
Pathos  Irony Implicit warrant 
Cyber-security 
requires a multi-
layered approach 
Laura Mather (2011) 
Ethos Metaphor я Inductive argument 
Logos я Antithesis Argumentum ad populum 
Pathos Irony я Implicit warrant 
,W¶VWLPHWRWDNHF\EHU-
security seriously  
Tony Busseri (2012) 
Ethos Metaphor я Inductive argument 
Pathos Antithesis Argumentum ad populum 
Logos я Irony я Implicit warrant 
 
The analysis found that the samples align with many of the predictions of the literature. 
The availability heuristic was found to be at play in the way that the samples create associations 
between technology and high dread events like terrorist attacks. Many of the samples also 
conflate cyber-WHUURULVPZLWKµKDFNWLYLVP¶DQGF\EHU-crime. The samples also show that 
traditional management guru techniques are being used to overdramatize and oversimplify the 
cybersecurity problem. The academic piece (Nicholson et al., 2012), the TED Talk by a 
computer scientist (Rubin, 2011), and the technical pieces (Mather, 2011; Busseri, 2012) succeed 
in making the argument that technology has introduced new vulnerabilities into our lives. 
However, the types of vulnerabilities that appear to be most frequent are those emanating from 
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µKDFNWLYLVP¶DQGF\EHU-crime. The arguments about the dangers of cyber-terrorism and cyber-
warfare are less compelling.  
The samples warning about the dangers of cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare use 
traditional management guru techniques to make their case (Clarke & Knake, 2010; Clarke, 
2012; Glenny, May 2011, July 2011; Lieberman, 2012; Coughlin, 2010). This trend is seen in 
WKHLUDUJXPHQWV¶FRQWUDGLFWRU\QDWXUHLQVWDELOLW\XVHRIUHF\FOHGLGHDVDQGUHOLDQFHRQVRIWGDWD
and logic ± four of the six features of administrative arguments identified by Hood and Jackson 
(1991). As such, it is possible that the dangers of cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare cited in 
these samples are indeed being overdramatized using traditional guru techniques.  
 
4.0 Discussion: Policy Implications 
A cybernetic understanding of control points to three components in a control system: 
information gathering, standard setting and behaviour modification. If any of its three 
components is absent, a system is not considered to be in control in a cybernetic sense (Hood, 
Rothstein & Baldwin, 2001, pp. 23-25). In this section we apply this lens to understand better the 
weaknesses in the risk regulation regime that governs cybersecurity and critical infrastructure, 
and the importance of framing the debate properly in order to address these weaknesses. 
Information Gathering 
Bertot et al. (2010) argue that transparency and the right to access government 
information are now internationally regarded as essential to democratic participation and trust in 
government. There is an absence of reliable information, however, on cybersecurity risks and 
recorded attacks. When information is available, there is a lack of reliable probability data that 
can place such events in the appropriate context. The few incidents that are public knowledge ± 
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such as the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, for example ± are often sensational, 
catastrophic and amplified in military terms by cyber specialists in the popular media. As a 
result, cyber-threats can be misunderstood as military or terrorist attacks rather than more 
mundane ± yet commonplace ± threats WREXVLQHVVRSHUDWLRQVVXFKDVµKDFNWLYLVP¶RUF\EHU-
crime.  
When it comes to critical infrastructure, many Western countries put considerable 
emphasis on information sharing. (See, for example, 3XEOLF6DIHW\&DQDGD$XVWUDOLD¶V
Attorney-*HQHUDO¶V'HSDUWPHQW8QLWHG.LQJGRP&HQWUHIRUWKH3URWHFWLRQRI1DWLRQDO
Infrastructure, 2006; United States: Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Nevertheless, 
years after 9/11 many of these goals continue to be aspirational (Dearstyne, 2005; Gordon, 
2010); governments continue to have a patchwork of information-sharing policies (Strickland, 
2005; Paquette, Jaeger & Wilson, 2010). Information sharing with respect to national security is 
constrained by a number of issues, including complexity and uncertainty (Renn, 2008), legal 
barriers (Quigley, 2013; Shore, 2008), capacity to share, institutional culture (Baker, 2010; 
Hood, 1998; Relyea, 2004), secrecy and, in the case of the private sector, which owns and 
operates most of the critical infrastructure, competition (Quigley & Mills, 2014). Industry leaders 
DUHUHOXFWDQWWRGLVFXVVWKHYXOQHUDELOLWLHVRIDVVHWVEHFDXVHRIWKHULVNWRWKHLURUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
security, liability, share value and public image (Quigley, 2013).  
 Developing trust within and between the public and private sectors is cited frequently in 
WKH:HVWHUQJRYHUQPHQWV¶&,3VWUDWHJLHVQRWHGDERYHDVDZD\WRDGGUHVVWKHVHLVVXHV$OWKRXJK
social scientists have given considerable attention to the problem of defining trust, a concise and 
universally accepted definition remains elusive. As a consequence, the term µtrust¶ is used in a 
variety of distinct and not always compatible ways in organizational research (Rousseau, Sitkin, 
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Burt & Camerer, 1998; Kramer, 1999; Barbalet, 2009; Hardin, 2006; Quigley, 2013). While 
most governments refer to trusted partnerships with industry, in many cases they may actually 
be referring to dependencies. Government takes risks when it aspires to be seen as a µtrusted 
partner¶ in this context. CI and emergency events can result in clashes over public and private 
sector accountability structures (Koliba, Mills & Zia, 2011; Koski, 2011). Industry responds to 
its shareholders and is rewarded for taking successful risks. Government has a regulatory role to 
play on behalf of citizens to ensure appropriate adherence to standards. Strengthening the 
relationships between government and industry can produce stability and collegiality among 
regulators and CI owners and operators, but may also result in compromises on transparency and 
prevent dramatic changes, if required (Vogel, 1986).  
Governments should therefore strengthen their role in the risk regulation regime, 
including in collecting, validating and disseminating information. Timely and actionable 
intelligence can allow CI owners, operators and managers to adapt according to their own needs 
and circumstances. Government should support a Knowledge Commons (Hess & Ostrom, 2007; 
Comfort, 2010); it includes a shared knowledge base and it requires infrastructure and 
organizational processes to support information search, exchange, updates, storage and 
transmission. Sector networks provide value to private industry. By exchanging ideas on µgood 
practices¶ in their sectors and lessons identified from previous failures, organizations can learn 
about what is working without having to discuss their vulnerabilities. Non-disclosure agreements 
and anonymized information can usefully facilitate learning opportunities. If the claims of the 
cyber specialist are indeed exaggerated, a more reliable information-gathering regime will help 
to expose this. At a minimum they will have either to reconsider their arguments or provide more 
convincing evidence.  
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Government itself is not without credibility issues, however. Polling in most Western 
countries suggests that trust in government is in decline (Edelman, 2013). In this sense, in trying 
to build up trust with CI owners and operators, government might be going in the wrong 
direction. Rather, it VKRXOGWU\WREXLOGXSWUXVWDPRQJFLWL]HQVLQJRYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\WR
regulate CI and those responsible for it. After all, critical infrastructure is not critical just for 
industry but for society as a whole. Ironically, most national strategies on critical infrastructure 
are completely silent on citizen engagement and outward accountability. While private firms will 
want to ensure their information is protected to a degree, this protection will have to be balanced 
with more outward accountability to ensure trust between governments and the citizenry grows 
in this policy area.  
 
Standard Setting 
Governments should be more specific about the terms they use to describe breaches in 
cybersecurity. We discuss four types in this paper: cyber-FULPHµKDFNWLYLVP¶F\EHU-terrorism 
and cyber-warfare. The perpetrators of each are driven by different motives, and have access to 
different resources; the probability that each will occur is different; and the solutions to each will 
also be different. Equally, public officials should be mindful of the metaphors they employ. Our 
UHVHDUFKVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHPHWDSKRURIF\EHUDVDµEDWWOHILHOG¶IRUH[DPSOHLVRverused and 
inaccurate. The metaphor implies that the risk should be understood in military terms and chiefly 
as one of survival as opposed to a trade-off between costs and benefits; this distinction has a 
potentially powerful impact on the manner in which one approaches a risk problem. When the 
survival of the firm is at stake, risk can no longer be described as the product of probability and 
expected monetary losses. A more appropriate description in these cases can be attempted in 
27 
 
terms of cardinal utilities (Jaeger et al., 2001). This extreme position is rarely the case with 
critical infrastructure, however. For the most part, owners and operators of CI balance threats 
with opportunities. Industry is not immediately concerned with the traditional concerns of 
departments of defense, such as in international espionage or warfare. Rather, industry is more 
concerned, as Lewis (2003) points out, about insider threats, extortion, industrial espionage, 
intellectual property, the protection of financial data and learning good practices from others in 
its sector.  
A market approach to critical infrastructure protection, however, has challenges. While 
standing at the ready for low-probability/high-consequence events can rarely be justified in 
market terms, failure to do so creates risk not only for the firm itself but for all those who depend 
on it. In a highly interdependent and just-in-time context, the cost of failure can be considerable 
for the supply chain or, indeed, the community as a whole. Public safety is a public good; the 
costs associated with cybersecurity are susceptible to the problems of moral hazards and 
freeriding. This suggests vulnerabilities will persist. Government officials must develop a more 
nuanced understanding of risk. Many of the popular pieces we examined emphasize extreme 
consequences and overlook, suppress or exaggerate probabilities depending on the point the 
authors wish to make. Not all risks are equal. When, for instance, should government strategies 
DQGRSHUDWLRQVEHJXLGHGE\µZRUVWFDVHVFHQDULR¶WKLQNLQJ"3UHFDXWLRQDU\DSSURDFKHVWR
managing risks are expensive, if not at times illogical and contradictory (Sunstein, 2005). There 
are also opportunity costs.  Government policies that ban staff from using social media for 
security reasons, for instance, prevents public servants from engaging in relevant and important 
popular discourse that concern their policy areas (Roy, 2012; Fyfe & Crookall, 2010; Conabree, 
2011).   
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Government must develop a more effective method to prioritize systems and the security 
required for such systems. Sunstein (2009) advises that we should consider catastrophic and 
irreversible harms ± particularly to human and environmental safety ± as the risks that require a 
more cautious approach and one that is balanced with the others. More reliable data will help us 
to distinguish higher consequence risks from lower ones. Government must tolerate some level 
of risk with some systems, however, otherwise innovation will be stifled. The absence of data 
that can help officials to be more specific about the magnitude of the risk require that CI owners 
and operators avoid high vulnerability as best as they can, develop flexible responses to cope 
with surprises and a diversity of means to accomplish mission-critical tasks.  They also need to 
continue to gather reliable data and monitor the current state of risk. 
Behaviour Modification  
A major determinant in the successful adoption of e-government is acceptance of ICTs by 
public servants and the public (Bertot et al., 2010). Cyber is still in its infancy. We need to 
support a learning culture (Senge, 1990) underpinned by more reliable data collection, and the 
use of more appropriate metaphors and framing techniques to explain the nature of cyber-threats 
to laypersons. This learning culture needs to be upheld by the institutional arrangements. IT 
security professionals must be represented at senior administrative levels within governments 
and CI organizations to offer more neutral expert opinions to counter inflated cyber rhetoric. 
Managers frequently rely on each other for quality information and support in understanding 
cybersecurity threats (Quigley, Burns & Stallard, 2013). These formal and informal networks 
should be actively supported and encouraged within organizations and across communities of 
practice (Agranoff, 2008). Public agencies and organizations that operate the CI upon which 
society depends should be subject to audits to ensure they are meeting reasonable standards 
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according to their industry. We must also increase the pool of reliable information by 
declassifying more information (Quigley, 2009; Gordon, 2010) and encouraging greater 
cooperation between military and civilian operations in order to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of risks, as opposed to more extreme ones characterized by many cybersecurity 
specialists (Mittu et al., 2008).  
These recommendations are really just the beginning of this strategy; how to think about 
cyberspace is a long-term proposition and must involve the public. Most cyber security failures, , 
such as credit card fraud, ODFNWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIDµJRRG¶PHGLDVWRU\HJµFDWFKLQJDEDG
JX\¶DQGWKHUHIRUHWHQGQRWWREHLQFOXGHGLQ popular media coverage (Fowler & Quigley, 2014; 
Quigley & Mills, 2014). Lately, we have seen a rise in coverage of cyber bullying (Smith & 
Steffgen, 2013). Child abuse ± whether cyber or not ± generates considerable media coverage 
and it can often be highly emotionally charged (Hood et al., 2001; Fowler & Quigley, 2014). The 
government needs to use these types of events to raise awareness, not in an anxiety-generating 
way but rather to encourage a better understanding of risks associated with the Internet that 
emphasizes probability not just consequence, and the reasonable steps one can take to protect 
oneself. In so doing we can employ heuristics to characterize cyber risks as risks that affect 
people in their everyday lives, which are much more likely to be criminal acts or mischief, not 
warfare, and that these risks require an approach that balances opportunities with threats. Some 
have argued that cybersecurity is a civic duty (Harknett & Stever, 2009) though to date this 
argument has failed to take hold. More education in schools and at home about cyber risks will 
enhance our understanding of the issues. In turn, this focus will allow people to better protect 
themselves and also contribute to policy discussions about what level of risk we are prepared to 
tolerate in cyberspace, and how active the government should be in this policy area.  
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5.0 Conclusion 
The uncertainty of potential cyber security events has left policy-makers and the public 
vulnerable to exploitation by cyber-security gurus who could potentially manipulate laypeople 
into believing that threats posed by information technology are imminent and dire, even without 
offering sound evidence to justify such claims. Uncertain risks can generate surprises or 
realizations that are not anticipated or explained explicitly within a risk modeling framework.  
One immediate concern about cyber security threats therefore is that one single high profile 
event can serve as a framing event that can seem to validate many exaggerated claims, and 
indeed, lead to many more of such claims, which can result in over-reaction from policy-makers 
and the public. 
Taking the lead from the psychology and social-psychology of risk literature, government 
should work to minimize the vulnabilities associated with perceptions of dread, lack of control 
and the unknown, for example; it should also contribute to alternative narratives than the ones of 
cyber gurus that people can imagine and from which they can learn and draw meaning for the 
daily lives. 
To start, we must work harder to lift the veil from over cybersecurity. Reliable 
information related to cyber-secruity is not easily available. Neither CI owners and operators nor 
government readily disclose such information (Quigley 2013). Government must collect, validate 
and disseminate more data among owners and operators of CI to help improve our understanding 
of the risk.   
Government officials must also encourage a more nuanced understanding of risk. We 
discuss four types in this paper: cyber-FULPHµKDFNWLYLVP¶F\EHU-terrorism, and cyber-warfare. 
The perpetrators of each are driven by different motives and the solutions to each will also be 
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different. Moreover, government frames of reference differ at times from those of industry. 
Strategists for national defense, for instance, often interpret risks in terms of its capacity to 
withstand an attack from an enemy. In this calculation, survival is always paramount. In contrast, 
industry balances dangers with financial opportunities. Industry is not necessarily interested in 
international espionage or cyber-warfare; it is often more interested in insider threats, extortion, 
industrial espionage, intellectual property, liaibility, brand reputation, the protection of financial 
data and learning good practices from others in its sector. To assist industry, government can 
help to facilitate the exchange of information and establishment of standards in these areas, in 
particular. Relatedly, public officials should be mindful of the metaphors they employ. Our 
UHVHDUFKVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHPHWDSKRURIF\EHUDVDµEDWWOHILHOG¶IRUH[DPSOHLVRYHUXVHGDQGLV
often inaccurate and misleading.   
At an institutional level, government can make progress by recognizing the importance of 
peer-networks for managing cyber-security risks. Each public organization should also have a 
KLJKO\YLVLEOHDQGDFFHVVLEOH³F\EHU-VHFXULW\FKDPSLRQ´ZKRSURPRWHVDZDUHQHVVRIF\EHU-
security issues but can also provide a reliable internal resource that can offset the potentially 
powerful influence of external IT consultants whose incentives are not necessarily aligned with 
WKHSXEOLFRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VJRDOVGovernment must also develop a more effective method to 
prioritize systems and the security required for such systems.  We need to have a better 
understanding of what really needs to be protected to a high level and what does not, considering 
in particular the level of redundance and resilience in systems. Public bureaucracies are 
susceptible to regulating in the face of uncertainty (Hood 1998); over-regulating information 
availability jeopardizes the potential innovation and transparency of public institutions.  
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It is difficult to determine what influence cyber gurus actually have.  Despite the 
burgeoning management guru theme, it is not clear that IT public sector managers are convinced 
by the claims of management gurus at present. Generally, IT managers are motivated by the 
potential for IT innovation. In one recent study they expressed concerns about risks associated 
with, for example, data integrity, intellectual property, privacy, reputation and the 
trustworthiness of security information (Quigley, Burns and Stallard 2013).  Going forward, we 
recommend conducting a study that furthers our understanding of how IT managers monitor the 
external environment for emerging cyber-security threats and opportunities.  It will also be 
important to monitor how reliable cyber gurus are over time; we can do this by examining how 
cyber gurus change their rhetorical strategies as more data about the viability of threats become 
public and the public discourse changes.  
These recommendations are really just the beginning of this strategy; how to think about 
the cyber space is a long term proposition. If we think about the environmental movement, for 
example, it took decades to arrive at our present policies. Cyber needs to go undergo this same 
transformation.  
In fact, rather than a battlefield, it might be more appropriate to think of cyber-space as 
the American Wild West ± a place of little regulation and considerable opportunity and danger. 
All of our critical assets depend on the successful functioning of the Internet: supply chains 
depend on it; children play on it; adults shop on it. Still, unlike any other critical system upon 
which society depends, it exists largely without safeguards. In the same way that regulation in 
roads, aviation or medicine enhances its value to the community, cyber-space might also 
(ultimately) benefit from such regulation and education. It will require a public that is better 
informed of the risks and opportunities of the Internet. A strong education program that engages 
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the public might in the long term lead to the behavior change required to ensure that the benefits 
of cyber-space are maximized and its dangers reduced. This strategy will enhance personal 
responsibility, but will also carve out an appropriate role for government in protecting critical 
infrastructure and vulnerable populations.  
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